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Can informal law discipline subsidies?  
 
Gregory Shaffer, Robert Wolfe and Vinhcent Le1 
 





Some subsidies (such as for fossil fuels and fisheries) adversely affect global public goods (such 
as a stable climate and the maintenance of global fish stocks); others affect global price levels 
(domestic support for certain agriculture commodities), or have negative consequences for a 
trading partner. WTO members have negotiated an agreement on subsidies, but there are severe 
limits to that agreement’s ability to exercise discipline, and the prospects of its amendment remain 
limited. This article examines whether states can improve discipline through the use of informal 
mechanisms and, if so, under what conditions. Informal discipline on subsidies depends on the 
existence of fora to discuss definitions, generate information about their incidence, discuss 
whether a particular measure fits the definition, and consider whether a remedy exists. This article 
takes international organizations seriously as fora for generating “law,” not simply as bodies 
exercising power or coercion, and it explores a particular view of law. If codification is not the 
only indicator of law, if one accepts that law also emerges in social interaction, then we must 
attend to the less formal places where the law of subsidies emerges, and affects state actions. The 
analysis of where disciplines might be found is based on a three-level set of comparisons: (i) Within 
the WTO, involving horizontal compared to sectoral disciplines, with a focus on committee and 
other peer-review processes, rather than the traditional focus on the dispute settlement system; 
(ii) the WTO compared to, and in complement with, other international organizations addressing 
particular sectors; and (iii) international organizations compared to, and in complement with, 
non-governmental organizations. The article provides four case studies involving subsidies: (i) 
export credits, (ii) shipbuilding, (iii) fisheries, and (iv) fossil fuels. It assesses variations in number 
of actors, the conceptualization of the problem, definitions, obligation, data, and organizations 






Subsidies create transnational externalities, either through advantages provided to certain traders 
or through adversely affecting global public goods. Disciplining such government support through 
formally binding rules, however, is notoriously difficult, given the role of subsidies in public 
                                                 
1 Gregory Shaffer is Chancellor’s Professor at the University of California, Irvine School of Law; Robert Wolfe is 
Professor at Queen’s University School of Policy Studies; Vinhcent Le is a JD student at the University of California, 
Irvine School of Law. We are grateful to the co-authors and research assistants who helped with previous work on 
which some of this article builds. We wrote an earlier version of this article, entitled “Informal Law’s Discipline of 
Subsidies: Variation in Definitions, Obligations, Transparency, and Organizations,” for the International Centre on 
Trade and Sustainable and Development (ICTSD); that paper is part of the E15 Initiative “Strengthening the Global 
Trade System” on Subsidies, at http://e15initiative.org/themes/subsidies/ (April 2015).  
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policy. Can informal rules serve as a complement and alternative? We believe that a focus on 
formal codified law is insufficient for understanding how law develops and has effects on social 
understandings and practices. We assess whether the prospects and limits of informal legal rules 
to create international discipline on the use of government subsidies in areas where formal or 
“hard” law is not working well, or does not exist at all.  
The first challenge for disciplining subsidies is defining them. Any government 
expenditure is a subsidy; even revenue forgone in the form of tax breaks is a subsidy. Nobody 
would imagine that all such expenditure, and foregoing of revenue, should be subject to 
international obligations. States have worked for decades to agree on a definition of “subsidy” for 
trade purposes since subsidies can be a significant source of international conflict. Some subsidies 
(such as for fossil fuels and fishing) adversely affect global public goods (such as a stable climate 
and the maintenance of global fish stocks); others affect global price levels (domestic support for 
certain agriculture commodities), or have negative consequences for another country’s trading 
interests. Such definitional questions depend on the development of consensual understanding. 
Subsidies have been subject to evolving disciplines in the trading system since the original 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947, but we face the paradox that the current 
and much more sophisticated version of those disciplines in the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (ASCM) might be both too constraining, and too loose. On the one hand, 
the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO) as interpreted by the Appellate Body might 
interfere with legitimate policy measures, such as supporting the development of renewable 
energy.2 On the other hand, most subsidies are not subject to sanction in the dispute settlement 
system, including fossil fuel subsidies, perhaps the most pernicious of all; and, despite years of 
negotiations, Members have not agreed on disciplines for fisheries subsidies. Our motivation for 
the article lies in an assumption that the Doha Round negotiating group on Rules is not likely to 
reach consensus on an amendment of the ASCM any time soon, and that adjudication before WTO 
panels and the Appellate Body faces severe limits in advancing discipline in this area. The 
motivation, therefore is the question: if states cannot get to further hard law in the area of subsidies 
in the near future, can they improve discipline through the use of informal mechanisms and, if so, 
under what conditions? That is, do less formal mechanisms at the WTO or elsewhere help provide 
effective discipline? And if so, where do they, or where might they, work? 
We take international organizations seriously as fora for managing the trading system; we 
think about what they do as generating “law” in terms of practice, not simply as an exercise of 
power or coercion; and we explore a particular view of law. Legal positivists distinguish between 
hard and soft law with a binary binding/non-binding dichotomy.3 Hard law is then defined as 
enforceable rules with precise codification and a tough enforcement system. The “legalization” of 
the WTO compared to the GATT is therefore said to represent a transition from a ‘soft law’ to a 
‘hard law’ system.4 Hard law is used to refer to “enforceable” rules while soft law, or “non-
binding” law, means indicative standards. Analysts use the term “soft law” to recognize as “law” 
things that can be legal in their effects yet involve neither state legislation nor an international 
                                                 
2 Henok Birhanu Asmelash, 'Energy Subsidies and WTO Dispute Settlement: Why Only Renewable Energy Subsidies 
Are Challenged', 18(2) Journal of International Economic Law 261 (2015), at 274-778.  
3 Gregory C. Shaffer and Mark A. Pollack, 'Hard Vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, Complements, and Antagonists in 
International Governance', 94 Minnesota Law Review 706 (2010), at 712-17.  
4 Kenneth W Abbott and Duncan Snidal, 'Hard and Soft Law in International Governance', 54(3) International 
Organization 421 (2000), at 436, 441. 
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treaty. Some scholars rather use the term “informal” with respect to law to capture three distinct 
but often combined features: the involvement of (i) non-traditional actors (not just states, but also 
regulators, public agencies, central banks, expert groups, cities, business and NGOs), (ii) non-
traditional processes (not treaty-making in formal international organizations [IOs] like the WTO 
but in networks, arrangements or groups), and (3) non-traditional outputs (not treaties, but 
standards, guidelines, principles or arrangements).5  
Constructivist and new governance theorists go further, arguing that while commitments 
may vary in their degree of formal codification and their justiciability, neither explicitness nor 
courts are necessarily indicators of “law” if actors recognize a provision as legal and act 
accordingly.6 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), for 
example, has no formal dispute settlement system, yet signatories act “as if” certain obligations 
are binding, such as, for example, the Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits 
discussed in Part II.1. If codification is not the only indicator of law, if one accepts that law 
emerges in social interaction and practice,7 then we ought to attend to all the places where the law 
of subsidies emerges and disciplines state actions. 
Global governance can be viewed as operating through different mechanisms, such as 
coercion, reciprocity, learning, and socialization. Informal law, although often viewed as working 
through the latter two mechanisms, can work through all four. It can lead to social sanctions (such 
as consumer boycotts), or affect financing (such as from the International Monetary Fund [IMF] 
or World Bank), and thus work through coercion. It can work through reciprocity such as in WTO 
and OECD peer-review systems based on reciprocal commitments involving reporting, 
monitoring, and evaluation. It can lead to policy learning through information sharing and 
deliberation. And it can lead to social emulation and model mongering affecting practice.  
Law is most likely to play an effective role where its subjects reach a consensus on 
diagnosing the problem that law is designed to address. Informal discipline on subsidies depends 
on the existence of fora to discuss and clarify definitions, generate information about their 
incidence, discuss whether a particular measure fits the definition, and consider whether a remedy 
exists. In the trading system, the WTO provides a forum, but it is not alone, since so do the Group 
of Twenty (G-20), the OECD, the IMF, and informal networks organized by non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and other stakeholders. The success of the processes will depend on 
generating trustworthy data, identifying the relevant actors, and providing a forum for bringing 
them together. The monitoring of whatever rules emerge requires ongoing deliberation to ensure 
convergence of normative understandings as applied to particular contexts, and concordance 
between international norms and national and local practice. Only then will normative settlement 
                                                 
5 Joost Pauwelyn, 'Rule-Based Trade 2.0? The Rise of Informal Rules and International Standards and How They May 
Outcompete WTO Treaties', 17(4) Journal of International Economic Law 739 (2014), at 742. See also Gregory 
Shaffer and Mark A. Pollack, ‘The Interaction of Formal and Informal Lawmaking’, in Joost Pauwelyn, Ramses 
Wessel and Jan Wouters (eds), Informal International Lawmaking (2012) 241-270 (addressing guidelines, standards, 
declarations, and informal monitoring and peer-review processes). 
6 Cf. Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law, 2nd ed. (1969); Roderick A. Macdonald, 'Here, There…and Everywhere: 
Theorizing the Legal Pluralism of Jacques Vanderlinden', Mélanges Jacques Vanderlinen (2005); Robert Wolfe, 'See 
You in Geneva? Legal (Mis)Representations of the Trading System', 11(3) European Journal of International Relations 
339 (2005); Charles Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin (eds), Experimentalist Governance in the European Union (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010). 
7 Jutta Brunnée and Stephen J. Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law: An Interactional Account (2010) 
xviii, 411; Friedrich Kratochwil, The Status of Law in World Society: Meditations on the Role and Rule of Law, Vol. 
129 (2014) 101ff. 
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of the meaning of the rules emerge.8 When the legal order aligns with the understanding of the 
problem, and such normative settlement occurs across levels of social organization, one can refer 
to the creation of a transnational legal order in which norms and practices at the transnational, 
national, and local levels concord.9 
Information, and discussion of that information, in some sort of body provide an 
opportunity to learn from the experience of other countries and to consider whether government 
support serves a legitimate policy objective, or whether it is an attempt to manipulate the terms of 
trade at the expense of firms in other countries. The notion that transparency matters is based on 
the idea that sunshine can discipline the actions of states.10 The canonical idea, going back to Louis 
Brandeis, that sunshine is the best disinfectant, assumes that agents whose actions are exposed will 
hew more closely to shared understandings of the common good.11 If not, then other agents 
provided with information can exercise appropriate discipline. Sunshine in itself enables but does 
not cause change. In this view of agency, sunlight can contribute more to social order than 
coercion. Sunlight plays this role in the trading system by reducing information asymmetries. That 
is, individual governments may know what they are doing (though not what all parts or level of 
government are doing!), but firms, citizens, and trading partners do not know. Information 
understood in this way is a public good, and one that is likely to be underprovided. Even if the 
subsidy is legitimate, the public has a right to know, and other governments both need to be assured 
that the measure is legitimate, and they can learn from the policy experience of others. 
Organizations have comparative advantages, and issue areas vary in their characteristics, 
so that some organizations are relatively better suited for some issue areas than others. Actors’ 
choice among international organizations to discipline particular subsidies can reflect variation in 
their characterization of what makes a subsidy an international issue (such as whether it affects 
trading partners or undermines global public goods), and the number of parties affected by the 
particular subsidy (such as all countries or only a subset of countries in which a particular economic 
sector is established, such as shipbuilding or commercial jet aircraft). This article begins by 
addressing subsidies viewed primarily as trade concerns, and shows that parties do not have to do 
everything at the WTO. It then addresses subsidies viewed primarily as public goods concerns, 
such as fisheries and fossil fuel subsidies. 
We assess variation in subsidy disciplines in two ways, the first involving alternative fora 
within the WTO and other international organizations to address them; and the second involving 
four dimensions of variation within each of these institutional settings: definition of the subsidy; 
consensus over obligation; trustworthiness of data; and organizational characteristics.  
First, we consider variation: 
 
1. Within the WTO, involving the choice between cross-cutting (horizontal) compared to 
sectoral disciplines, with a focus on committee and other peer-review processes, rather than 
the traditional legal  focus on the dispute settlement system; and  
2. The WTO compared to, and in complement with, other international organizations 
addressing particular sectors, notably the OECD, including variation within the OECD. 
                                                 
8 See Terence Halliday and Gregory Shaffer, ‘Transnational Legal Orders’, in Terence Halliday and Gregory Shaffer 
(eds), Transnational Legal Orders (2015) 3-75, at 38-41 (on the issue of normative settlement). 
9 Ibid. 
10 See Petros C. Mavroidis and Robert Wolfe, 'From Sunshine to a Common Agent: The Evolving Understanding of 
Transparency in the WTO', 21(2) Brown Journal of World Affairs 174 (2015). 
11 Louis D. Brandeis, Other People's Money and How the Bankers Use It (New York: F.A. Stokes, 1914), Chapter V. 
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Second, we consider variation across our four case studies, on four dimensions: 
 
1. Definition of subsidies, which can be a proxy for the degree of consensual understanding 
in a sector. 
2. Obligations, which are necessarily subsequent to a definition of subsidy within a sector. 
3. Data, which vary by source, quality, and the amount of transparency provided to other 
governments and the public. 
4. Organizational characteristics, which vary in terms of opportunities for learning, 
surveillance, and dispute settlement.  
 
Our expectation is that definitional clarity (dimension 1) allows for stronger discipline 
(dimension 2) because everyone understands the obligations. More trustworthy data (dimension 3) 
means more sunshine, which allows trading partners and stakeholders to apply pressure for reform. 
And such pressure is more readily applied in organizations with a strong institutional structure 
(dimension 4) that provides for sustained interaction to clarify definitions and obligations, and to 
ensure monitoring, facilitate learning and determine remedies. We also expect disciplines focused 
on a smaller number of affected actors to be easier to reach than those involving large numbers, 
such as the beneficiaries of fossil fuel subsidies.  
Part II discusses the contribution and limits of transparency and surveillance to the 
horizontal discipline of subsidies in the WTO. Part III presents four sectoral case studies involving 
organizations other than the WTO: the OECD export credit arrangement; OECD shipbuilding 
initiatives; various initiatives on fisheries subsidies; and various ones on fossil fuel subsidies. The 
article concludes by asking: What works? Are informal disciplines possible? 
 
II. Horizontal Subsidies Discipline in the WTO 
 
The dispute settlement system is thought to be the jewel in the WTO crown, the means of enforcing 
the rules. But here is the puzzle — while subsidies have been the subject of 103 complaints in the 
WTO, constituting 21 percent of all disputes, and 25 percent of the cases resulting in a Panel or 
Appellate Body decision, the number of cases filed is minute relative to the volume of state aids 
and world trade. Disputes are the small tip of a large pyramid of conflict management mechanisms 
in the WTO.12 A focus on disputes as enforcement of hard law obscures the other, perhaps more 
important though less formal, aspects of the WTO contribution to subsidies discipline. 
In the WTO, transparency and monitoring provisions are primarily focused on helping to 
ensure that existing commitments are met. They can, in theory, however, also lead to new 
knowledge that can lead to changes in the rules, their interpretation, and practices, including by 
giving rise to new understandings among policymakers. Three actions are especially important for 
the operation of transparency in the WTO regarding subsidies—how the other Members of the 
WTO are notified of the new policy action; how a notification is discussed in Geneva; and whether 
                                                 
12 Robert Wolfe, 'Letting the Sun Shine in at the WTO: How Transparency Brings the Trading System to Life', World 
Trade Organization (WTO) (2013), at 24, available at https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd201303_e.pdf 
(visited 10 September 2015); see Henrik Horn, Petros C. Mavroidis, and Erik N. Wijkstrom, 'In the Shadow of the 
DSU: Addressing Specific Trade Concerns in the WTO SPS and TBT Committees', 47(4) Journal of World Trade 729 
(2013) (discussing informal trade conflict resolution in WTO committees). 
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the results of the Geneva process are published in a way that allows citizens to hold their 
government accountable for its use of public money. 
In the WTO Glossary, a “notification” is defined as “a transparency obligation requiring 
member governments to report trade measures to the relevant WTO body if the measures might 
have an effect on other Members.”13 In previous work, Collins-Williams and Wolfe showed how 
the record of industrial subsidies notification under the ASCM was poor.14 It still is. As shown in 
Table 1, more than half of the Members are still not notifying their subsidies. Some Members have 
not submitted a notification for many years, and Members question the comprehensiveness of the 
notifications that have been submitted. While some notifications run to hundreds of pages, others 
are very brief.  
 
Table 1: Status of Subsidies Notifications15 
  2007 2009 2011 2013 
Members that notified subsidies 46% 46% 45% 37% 
Members that made a “nil” notification  8% 14% 14% 11% 
Sub-total notifying Members 54% 60% 59% 48% 
Members that did not make any notification  46% 40% 41% 52% 
 
 In the face of continued weak notification, the chair of the Committee on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (SCM Committee) began reading out the names of Members who were 
late.16 When that did not improve the rate of notification, he invited all of the Members who were 
late to explain the delay to the committee.17 Among the most important players invited to offer 
such explanations at the April 2012 meeting were China, the European Union (EU) (on behalf of 
Austria and Greece), India, Indonesia, Nigeria, South Africa, and Thailand.18 The excuses offered 
included technical and capacity constraints, and coordination difficulties.19 In April 2013, the SCM 
chair listed the 71 Members that had not made 2011 notifications, including four of the top 30 
merchandise exporters — China, Indonesia, Thailand, and the United Arab Emirates.20 
Why do Members not notify subsidies? Four reasons can be advanced. The first is 
bureaucratic incapacity, which may be the case for many developing countries whose trade 
ministries are understaffed and lack resources. Second, Members might worry about providing 
adverse information for a potential legal dispute, perhaps about a measure they suspect might be 
illegal. By notifying, they provide information that a trading partner might not have and they admit 
                                                 
13 WTO, ‘Glossary’, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/glossary_e/glossary_e.htm (visited 10 September 2015).  
14 See Terry Collins-Williams and Robert Wolfe, 'Transparency as a Trade Policy Tool: The WTO’s Cloudy 
Windows',  9(4) World Trade Review 551 (2010), at 564-65.  
15 WTO, 'Overview of Developments in the International Trading Environment: Annual Report by the Director-
General', Trade Policy Review Body, WT/TPR/OV/16, 31 January 2014,Table 21. 
16 WTO, ‘Minutes of the Regular Meeting Held on 26-27 October 2011’, Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures, G/SCM/M/79, 2 February 2012, para. 143-44. 
17 Ibid. para. 147 
18 Ibid, para. 145.  
19 Ibid, para. 146, 157, 159, 161. 
20 WTO, 'Notification Requirements Under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures’, Committee 
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, G/SCM/W/546/Rev.4, 16 April 2013, at 14; WTO, 'Minutes of the Regular 
Meeting Held on 22 April 2013’, Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, G/SCM/M/85, 5 August 
2013, para. 26. 
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that the measures might be actionable. Third, Members’ trade authorities find it easier to notify 
actions taken by themselves (like the number of new dumping investigations commenced by the 
commerce department) than data on subsidies offered by other ministries, or other levels of 
government. The fourth reason, and perhaps most important, is ambiguity about what to notify. 
The ASCM has no preamble stating the objects and purposes of the agreement that could provide 
contextual guidance for interpretation. Some observe that the ASCM’s very vagueness allowed it 
to be concluded in the first place, so that, in part, it constitutes the recording of a dis-agreement.  
The definition of a subsidy determines what must be notified. The first part of the 
definition, in Article 1.1 of the ASCM, requires a financial contribution or price or income support 
provided by the government. The second part, in Article 1.2, requires that a benefit be conferred 
to the recipient, which entails an exercise of comparison between a situation where a recipient 
receives the financial contribution and one where it does not. The ASCM classified subsidies as 
prohibited, actionable, or non-actionable.21 Two categories of subsidies, import substitution and 
export subsidies, are prohibited.22 For a Member to take action against a “harmful” subsidy of 
another Member that is actionable, it has to be specific and the adverse effects have to be 
demonstrated.23   
The SCM committee’s notification questionnaire, therefore, requires Members to notify 
“a) all specific subsidies … and b) all other subsidies, which operate directly or indirectly to 
increase exports” (emphasis added).24 The legal text and the jurisprudence fail, however, to clarify 
the conditions under which subsidies are specific, perhaps because the concept lacks solid 
economic justification.25 What also makes determining notification obligations difficult is that part 
of the questionnaire that requests “Statistical data permitting an assessment of the trade effects of 
the subsidy” (emphasis added).26 Whether a subsidy has trade effects requires a judgment by the 
notifier, one that does not lend itself to a quick assessment by government officials. Moreover, 
such data may be perceived as a confession inviting a dispute, and thus, not surprisingly, are rarely 
provided.27 Given the different, incomplete, and sometimes unclear notifications that Members 
have submitted to the WTO, it seems that they are confused about what the definition covers and, 
as a consequence, are unclear on which subsidies they ought to notify. Rubini thus concludes that 
all subsidies should be notified to the WTO, allowing questions to be asked in the committee.28 
But given that the Appellate Body has determined that understandings reached in the committee 
can have the status of “subsequent agreement” in the sense of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties and thus be enforceable in dispute settlement, as happened in US-Tuna II,29 
                                                 
21 Articles 3, 5 and 8 of the ASCM.  
22 Article 3 of the ASCM. 
23 Articles 2, 5, and 6 of the ASCM. 
24 WTO, ‘Questionnaire Format for Subsidy Notifications Under Article 25 of the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures and Under Article XVI of GATT 1994’(ASCM Questionnaire), Committee on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures, G/SCM/6/Rev.1, 11 November 2003, at 1, para. 1.  
25 Luca Rubini, The Definition of Subsidy and State Aid: WTO and EC Law in Comparative Perspective (2009) 359-
66. 
26 ASCM Questionnaire, above n 24, at 3, para. 10.  
27 Collins-Williams and Wolfe, above n 14, at 575.  
28 Rubini, above n 25. 
29 WTO Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna 
and Tuna Products, WT/DS841/AB/R, adopted 16 May 2012, para. 371; see also Gregory Shaffer, ‘The WTO Tuna-
Dolphin II Case: United States — Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna 
Products’, 1 American Journal of International Law (2013), at 6.  
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Members might be reluctant to go that far. Such hesitation exemplifies the risk that hard law 
dispute settlement impedes consensual decision making through informal, soft law mechanisms. 
The committee process ought to be central. As a result of questions and challenges posed 
before the SCM Committee, a government may provide more information, change policy, or 
pressure other units of government to respond. ASCM article 26 mandates the committee to 
examine subsidy notifications on a regular basis. The agreement also contains provisions for 
“reverse notification” pursuant to which Members may request information on subsidies that they 
think another Member was obliged to notify,30 and can notify measures that they think a trading 
partner should have notified.31 The United States (US) has submitted extensive reverse 
notifications of Chinese and Indian subsidies,32 but few other Members have the capacity to 
generate such analysis of another Member’s policies. 
A recent EU proposal in the Doha Round negotiating group on Rules addresses many of 
these issues.33 The proposal suggests that the Secretariat could examine the Semi-Annual reports 
in which Members list the programs they have countervailed to establish if those programs have 
been notified by the Member granting the subsidy.34 Where the subsidies have not been notified, 
the Secretariat could prepare a notification in the usual format and circulate it as a supplement to 
any notification of the Member granting the subsidy.35 Next, they suggest that notified subsidies 
would benefit from a rebuttable presumption of non-actionability or an increase in the standards 
for action under the ASCM in order to create an incentive for more notification leading to greater 
committee oversight.36 The EU also suggested improvements to the template for the notification 
for fishery subsidies under the ASCM, which includes elements additional to those for other 
sectors.37 Here too the EU proposes that duly notified fisheries subsidies would be presumed to be 
non-actionable or at least be more difficult to challenge.38 
Members differ hugely in their ability to ask questions in the committee. Collins-Williams 
and Wolfe found that a small number of Members consistently asked questions in the SCM and 
Agriculture committees in 2006–07, and were also consistently targets.39 The nearly 900 questions 
asked in the SCM Committee from 2008 to 2012 were asked by only 16 Members, all but two of 
whom are G20 countries, but the questions were posed to 58 Members (counting the EU as one).40 
This disparity shows most clearly in the bars on the right of Figure 1 — other developing countries 
receive many more questions than they pose.  
 
                                                 
30 Article 25.8 of the ASCM 
31 Article 25.10 of the ASCM 
32 For example, on fisheries support, see WTO, ‘Subsidies: Request From the United States to China Pursuant to 
Article 25.8 of the Agreement’, Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, G/SCM/Q2/CHN/52, 17 April 
2015.    
33 WTO, ‘Rules Negotiations – Transparency: Communication From the European Union’(Communication from the 
EU), Negotiating Group on Rules, TN/RL/W/260, 16 July 2015. 
34 Ibid, at 2. 
35 Mavroidis and Wolfe see this as the Secretariat acting as the common agent of Members. See Mavroidis and Wolfe, 
above n 10, at 5-6. 
36 WTO, ‘Communication from the EU’, above n 33, at 2.  
37 Ibid, at 3-4. 
38 Ibid. 
39 See Collins-Williams and Wolfe, above n 14, at  566, 570. 






Figure 2 shows what these questions concerned. Noteworthy is how seldom Members ask 
about trade effects, and how often they ask about eligibility and local content — that is, about 
specificity, which would make the subsidies actionable. We have not investigated whether the 
questioners were satisfied with the answers, or whether the answers clarified the matter, or 
provided the information necessary to launch a new dispute. Informality can be hampered by a 
fear that comments made in a committee discussion, or even accepting that the matter was a 
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Subsidies are often mentioned in preferential trade agreements (PTAs), but the disciplines 
are weak, and PTAs generally do not create either notification requirements for subsidies, or a 
body where such notification could be reviewed. PTAs also lack a secretariat able to support a 
robust transparency process, which could be a reason PTA partners rarely use their anemic dispute 
settlement provisions. Not surprisingly, therefore, PTA partners make good use of the WTO 
committee review mechanism. Since 2008, eight of the 16 Members that posed questions in the 
SCM Committee posed them to a PTA partner. Only three of the 59 questions asked by Australia 
went to its PTA partners, but 46 of 126 questions posed by Canada went to the US, its North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) partner, and the EU and the US asked each other 128 
of the 880 questions posed in the committee (98 were questions the US posed of the EU, and 30 
were questions the EU posed of the US). In other words, PTAs formally often include both 
formally binding rules and formal dispute settlement to enforce them. Yet these hard law 
mechanisms may be much less effective in disciplining subsidies than informal law mechanisms 
of notification and peer review. 
 
A. Trade Policy Review Mechanism 
 
A helpful alternative forum within the WTO to generate more information about subsidies with an 
opportunity for discussion is the Trade Policy Review Body (TPRB). The central objective of the 
TPRB is “to contribute to  ... the smoother functioning of the multilateral trading system, by 
achieving greater transparency in, and understanding of, the trade policies and practices of 
Members.”41 The TPRB generates three sorts of reports — (i) the periodic Trade Policy Review 
                                                 
41 Annex 3(A)(i) of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. 















Figure 2: Categorization of Questions Asked in 2009-10
Source: WTO, SCM Committee
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(TPR) of each Member; (ii) the annual review of the state of the trading system; and (iii) the 
monitoring reports on measures taken in response to the financial crisis.42 In these reports to the 
TPRB, issued on the authority of the Director-General (and not of Members), the Secretariat 
sometimes warns or expresses concerns on the basis of its analysis, but never criticizes Members 
explicitly, and never comments on their rights and obligations under the WTO agreements. 
Discussion in the TPRB therefore does not imply either that a measure is or is not actionable. 
The core of each TPR report is based on notifications from Members, but each report builds 
from a far wider range of information. The Secretariat collects data from official sources 
(questionnaires to Member under review) and non-official sources, including from other 
international organizations, media reports, and NGOs.43 To ensure accuracy, the Secretariat seeks 
verification of the data from non-official sources when discussing the draft of its report with the 
Member.44 Given the difficulties devising disciplines regarding subsidies of service providers 
under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), and thus the lack of notification 
obligations under it, we only know about services subsidies because of those that surface in TPR 
reports.45 
Subsidies clearly increased after the 2008 financial crisis and they have been a particular 
concern in the crisis-monitoring exercise of the TPRB because of their effects on the trading 
system, for good as well as ill. Annex 4, added to the 2012 WTO annual monitoring report,46 is a 
valiant attempt to address subsidies (called “General Economic Stimulus Measures”), although the 
Secretariat observed that assessment is inevitably biased because of the paucity of information 
provided by Members, sometimes because they claim in response to the Director-General’s 
questionnaire that the relevant supports are not “new measures” and hence not covered by the 
process.47 While the reports are one of the few sources of systematically collected subsidies data, 
they are not strictly comparable, the Secretariat observes, because absence or presence of data in 
the report on any one country may be an artifact of information problems, rather than an indication 
that the Member does or does not maintain such subsidies.48 TPR reports on individual Members 
face the same difficulty, showing considerable variation in coverage of the major economies. A 
recent report on the EU had seven pages on subsidies and government assistance,49 and that on the 
                                                 
42 WTO,’Overview of Developments in the International Trading Environment’ (Overview of Developments), Trade 
Policy Review Body, WT/TPR/OV/14, 21 November 2011, para. 178ff. To access country specific Trade Policy 
Reviews, see WTO, ‘Trade Policy Reviews: The Reviews’, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp_rep_e.htm 
(visited 11 September 2015). 
43 See Julien Chaisse and Mitsuo Matsushita, 'Maintaining the WTO's Supremacy in the International Trade Order: A 
Proposal to Refine and Revise the Role of the Trade Policy Review Mechanism', 16(1) Journal of International 
Economic Law 9 (2013), at 21; Arunabha Ghosh, ‘Strengthening WTO Surveillance: Making Transparency Work for 
Developing Countries’, in Carolyn Deere Birkbeck (ed), Making Global Trade Governance Work for Development 
(Cambridge University Press, 2011) 394-441, at 431. 
44 See WTO, ‘Overview of Developments’, above n 42, para. 180. 
45 See WTO, 'Subsidies for Services Sectors Information Contained in WTO Trade Policy Reviews’, Working Party 
on GATS Rules, S/WPGR/W/25/Add.6, 18 March 2013. 
46WTO, (2012) 'Overview of Developments in the International Trading Environment: Annual Report by the Director-
General,' World Trade Organization, WT/TPR/OV/15, 29 November 2012. WTO, ‘Report to the TPRB from the 
Director-General on Trade-Related Developments’, Trade Policy Review Body, WT/TPR/OV/W/6, 28 June 2012.  
47 Ibid, para. 112. 
48 Ibid, para. 118. 
49 WTO, ‘Trade Policy Review Report by the Secretariat: The European Union’, Trade Policy Review Body, 
WT/TPR/S/317, 18 May 2015, at 64-72. 
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US had two pages under “Measures Affecting Investment and Trade.”50 The Japan report had five 
paragraphs on “Subsidies and support,”51 the Korea report only briefly touched on export 
subsidies.52 The TPR for China has more than three pages about “Subsidies and other government 
assistance,” but notes that “very few details are available on China’s subsidies and other 
government assistance, particularly at the sub-central level, on their type and size, the financial 
outlays involved, and the objectives of the programmes and their results.”53 In contrast, coverage 
on subsidies issues was not obvious in the reports on Brazil, Mexico, and Indonesia, though the 
latter in particular is known to be a heavy provider of fossil fuel subsidies.54 
The coverage of subsidies in TPR reports may reflect the extent to which the Secretariat 
sees the issue as a challenge for the country, but it could also be a reflection of the reluctance of 
Members to provide information. We contend that where notification is weak, the Secretariat 
should act as the “common agent” of all participants in the trading system, actively seeking 
information.55 For example, the TPR of Malaysia in 2014 used public sources to go well beyond 
the country’s 2009 and 2011 SCM notification, and the US 2012 reverse notification, to 
demonstrate that the country was one of the most heavily subsidized in its region.56 
In sum, informal mechanisms can have bite, but they depend on social interaction. When 
drafting the ASCM, negotiators worried that some legitimate government measures might meet 
the test of being a subsidy, but should not face sanction in the dispute settlement system, and so 
they created a category of “non-actionable” subsidies in Article 8. That provision lapsed after five 
years, and will likely not be recreated. Yet that provision can still reflect a normative understanding 
among Members even though it is not formally in effect. For example, Article 8 covered 
government support for research. Such support is ubiquitous, which might lead one to think that it 
risks being subject to countervail. And yet in all the years since Article 8 lapsed, government 
support for research came up only a handful of times in questions in the SCM Committee, and 
seems to be mentioned in formal disputes only in the infamous Boeing-Airbus saga. We suggest 
that this tacit acceptance of support for research is a case of Members acting “as if” the subsidies 
are covered by the now lapsed provisions of Article 8. That is, the “non-actionable” category lives 
on implicitly in Members’ understanding of appropriate policy. This phenomenon reflects what 
could be called Members’ social understanding of WTO law diffused throughout the WTO 
community.57 It can be argued, therefore, that the interactional opportunities for the development 
and affirmation of a shared understanding of what fidelity to WTO obligations entails allows actors 
(or at least, active participants who represent a subset of the membership) to know what the WTO 
law is without formal amendment of the treaty or an Appellate Body decision.  
                                                 
50 WTO, ‘Trade Policy Review: Report by the Secretariat - United States’, Trade Policy Review Body, 
WT/TPR/S/307, 11 November 2014, at 80-81. 
51 WTO, “Trade Policy Review: Report by the Secretariat - Japan’, Trade Policy Review Body, WT/TPR/S/310, 19 
January 2015, at 52-53 
52 WTO, ‘Trade Policy Review: Report by the Secretariat - Korea’, Trade Policy Review Body, WT/TPR/S/268, 15 
August 2012, at 81.  
53 WTO, 'Trade Policy Review: Report by the Secretariat - China’, Trade Policy Review Body, WT/TPR/S/264/Rev.1, 
20 July 2012, at 68-72. 
54 See TPR reports for Brazil (WT/TPR/S/283), Mexico (WT/TPR/S/279) and Indonesia (WT/TPR/S/278). 
55 See Mavroidis and Wolfe, above n 10. 
56 WTO, 'Trade Policy Review: Report by the Secretariat - Malaysia', Trade Policy Review Body, WT/TPR/S/292, 27 
January 2014, at 9, para. 16, 59, 66-67 (looking at speeches, news articles, OECD reports, banking data, and other 
sources, to find the extent of Malaysia’s subsidies).  
57 Fuller, above n 6, at 106, Brunnée and Toope, above n 7, at 34, 8, 64, 101. 
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Some WTO committees have a policy-oriented discussion on the margins of the regular 
committee meetings through which normative understandings of a rule’s interpretation and 
appropriate implementation can be developed. Examples include discussions in the Committee on 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures, the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), 
and the Committee on Trade and the Environment (CTE).  These committees tend to bring together 
technocratic officials specialized in particular domains. But such policy discussions do not occur 
in connection with the SCM Committee. Why not? One reason appears to be constraints on WTO 
Secretariat resources. But it could also be that governments do not want to discuss the issues, 
perhaps for political reasons, or out of concerns about the balance of rights and obligations. One 
weakness of the WTO, ironically, could therefor be its codification of “binding” obligations in a 
treaty that includes formalized dispute settlement that traders perceive as “hard” law. The result is 
that amendments, revisions, and new obligations have become difficult, if not impossible, to 
negotiate. 
The organization of specific fora that bring together discrete networks of regulatory 
officials also appears to matter, as exemplified by WTO Members’ distinct handling of agricultural 
subsidies. Our discussion so far has focused on the procedural aspects of informal WTO disciplines 
on all non-agricultural subsidies. The distinction between agricultural and non-agricultural 
subsidies is significant. Export subsidies under GATT 1947 were illegitimate only for “non-
primary” products.58 Contracting Parties were only enjoined to “avoid” applying export subsidies 
to primary products, and, if export subsidies were applied, they should not result in a Contracting 
Party having “more than an equitable share of world export trade in that product.”59 At the 1982 
GATT ministerial, participants agreed to examine all subsidies affecting agriculture separately, 
especially export subsidies, and the 1986 Punta del Este declaration maintained that negotiations 
should aim at “improving the competitive environment by increasing discipline on the use of all 
direct and indirect subsidies and other measures affecting directly or indirectly agricultural trade, 
including the phased reduction of their negative effects and dealing with their causes.”60 The 
eventual 1994 Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) hived off agriculture subsidies 
from the ASCM.61 Efforts to develop further disciplines on agricultural subsidies, especially 
domestic support, but also on export credits in agriculture after a failure at the OECD,62 remain a 
central element of the Doha Round, to be handled apart from industrial subsidies. 
The implication of the example of agricultural subsidies is that the general or “horizontal” 
disciplines of the ASCM may not be suitable for all sectors; and experience in other areas suggests 
that the WTO itself may not be the appropriate forum for all sectors. While the 1979 plurilateral 
Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft mentions subsidies,63 it has never been invoked in a GATT 
or WTO complaint. The 1992 EC-US bilateral Agreement on Trade in Large Civil Aircraft had 
                                                 
58 Article XVI(3) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1947). 
59 Ibid.  
60 Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, GATT Doc. No. MIN.DEC, 20 September 1986, at 6.  
61 Robert Wolfe, 'Endogenous Learning and Consensual Understanding in Multilateral Negotiations: Arguing and 
Bargaining in the WTO', Canadian Agricultural Trade Policy and Competitiveness Research Network CATRPN 
Working Paper No. 2010-02 (2010), at 22.  
62 See Mike Roberts, ‘OECD and Agricultural Credits: A Singular Failure’, in Smart Rules for Fair Trade: 50 years 
of Export Credits (OECD Publishing, 2011) 107-11 (finding that the failure to obtain consensus on agricultural export 
credits was an exception to the usual success of the OECD export credit family). 
63 Article 6.1 of the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft, done at Geneva, 12 April 1979, OJ L71, 17/03/1980, at 58. 
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strong language on transparency,64 but weak institutional provisions. The agreement was 
unilaterally terminated by the US in 2004 when it filed its WTO complaint about Airbus subsidies, 
but the US cited the subsidies commitments of the bilateral agreement in its WTO complaints. The 
long-running Canada-US softwood lumber conflict, resulting in numerous WTO and NAFTA 
disputes, is now subject to a bilateral accord.65 The special characteristics of the steel and 
shipbuilding industries led to initiatives for distinct disciplines at the OECD, as did export credits, 
itself containing both general provisions and sectoral annexes. And, of course, discussion on 
fisheries subsidies and fossil fuel subsidies occurs in many places in addition to, or instead of, the 
WTO. In the next section we address the role and operation of other fora for such sectoral 
disciplines. 
 
III. SECTORAL CASE STUDIES 
 
The law of subsidies should be viewed on a continuum. Most generally, collective understandings 
on the definition of subsidies and mutual obligations may eventually be codified or even 
adjudicated in the WTO, but those understandings begin to emerge elsewhere. More particularly, 
other organizations may hold data on the incidence of subsidies that is more comprehensive than 
that held in the WTO, and these other organizations may be better placed to develop disciplines 
separately or as a complement to those in the WTO. The information and disciplines generated can 
feed into and inform the WTO peer-review and dispute settlement processes. And such WTO 
mechanisms may play no, or only a minor, role in disciplining particular types of subsidies 
compared to such other organizations.  
We have selected four sectoral cases for examination that represent variation in (i) the 
conceptualization of the subsidy as a trade or public goods problem; (ii) the number of countries 
affected; (iii) the definition of a the sectoral subsidy; (iv) the extent of formal obligation; (v) the 
extent of data and transparent reporting and peer review; and (vi) the organizations addressing the 
issue. Two case studies (concerning fisheries and fossil fuel subsidies) entail subsidies defined as 
a public goods problem involving a large number of countries. The other two case studies 
(concerning export credits and shipbuilding subsidies) entail subsidies defined as a trade problem 
involving a relatively smaller number of countries. The OECD disciplines in these domains differ 
in their degree of formal obligation, with export credits being governed by formally non-binding 
rules, while shipbuilding initiatives aimed (but failed) to create formally binding rules backed by 
dispute settlement. We first consider the OECD’s work on export credits and shipbuilding 
subsidies. 
 
A. OECD’s Work on Export Credits  
 
An export credit is a loan issued by a government or private bank that generally allows purchasers 
to defer payment for industrial products such as capital goods or commercial aircraft, or for 
services, notably engineering services. Foreign buyers may base their purchasing decision on 
whether an exporter can provide acceptable financing terms. This financing may be too costly or 
simply unavailable from commercial lenders due to incomplete information and the risk of default. 
                                                 
64 Article 8 of the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Government of the United States 
of America concerning the application of the GATT Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft on trade in large civil 
aircraft, done at Brussels and Washington, 17 July 1992, OJ L301, 17/10/1992, at 33-34. 
65 Softwood Lumber Agreement, U.S.-Canada, 29 May 1996, 35 I.L.M 1195 (1996). 
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Export credit agencies (ECAs) are public or semi-public banks that fill these gaps in private export 
financing by providing loans, insurance, and guarantees at below-market rates. ECAs receive 
government support in the form of access to treasury funds and public capital markets — subsidies, 
in other words. These export finance subsidies create trade distortions since buyers make 
purchasing decisions on the basis of the export credit terms rather than the price and quality of the 
goods.  
 International cooperation on export credit policy began in 1934 with the formation of the 
Berne Union, a multilateral group of private and state ECAs that sought to reduce commercial risk 
through the exchange of information on foreign borrowers.66 In the 1970s, facing large trade 
deficits due to rising oil prices, nations increasingly subsidized export credits to boost exports, 
resulting in a sharp increase in ECA lending. Talks among OECD trade ministers resulted in the 
1978 Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits (Arrangement). Since 1978, the 
Participants to the Arrangement (Participants) have significantly developed the Arrangement to 
adapt to changing circumstances and to close loopholes.67 It has helped build a shared social 
understanding of appropriate export credit practices that have shaped state action. 
 The Arrangement formally lies outside of the OECD, but is serviced by the OECD 
secretariat. The Working Party on Export Credits and Credit Guarantees (ECG), created in 1963, 
operates as an official OECD committee. Both the Arrangement and the ECG define export credits 
as a trade problem. The ECG brings together export credit and trade and treasury officials from all 
OECD members (other than Chile and Iceland) to review the operation of both member and non-
member export credit systems. In addition, partly in response to pressure from NGOs, the ECG 
has developed principles of good governance on issues such as anti-bribery measures, and 
environmental and social due diligence.68  
 The Arrangement is based on consensus, and not on formally international binding law.69  
Its Participants include a majority of the states that provide officially supported export finance—
Australia, Canada, the EU (with 20 EU members having ECAs), Japan, Korea, New Zealand, 
Norway, Switzerland, and the US.70 The European Commission participates alone in the 
Arrangement, although EU member states participate directly in the ECG. The Participants are not 
bound by the OECD rules of procedure, allowing for the participation of non-OECD members, 
thus creating a more informal and inclusive negotiation process.71 Many countries observe the 
process in some way. Israel and Turkey, for example, are observers at Participants’ meetings, and 
Brazil is a full Participant in the Arrangement’s Sector Understanding on Export Credits for Civil 
Aircraft.72   
                                                 
66 For an overview of the Arrangement’s history, see Andrew M. Moravcsik, 'Disciplining Trade Finance: The OECD 
Export Credit Arrangement', 43(1) International Organization 173 (1989), at 178-81 and Francois de Ricolfis, ‘A Long 
History in Facing Challenges’ in Smart Rules for Fair Trade: 50 Years of Export Credits (2011) 101-106. 
67 See Janet West, ‘Export Credits and the OECD’, in Smart Rules for Fair Trade: 50 Years of Export Credits (Paris: 
OECD Publishing, 2011) 19-40, at 24-26, 38-39; Moravcsik above n 66, at 185-86.  
68 See Michael H. Wiehan, ‘The OECD and Civil Society in the Fight Against Corruption’, in Smart Rules for Fair 
Trade: 50 Years of Export Credits (2011) 120-24; West, above n 67, at 23-24. 
69 Janet Koven Levit, 'The Dynamics of International Trade Finance Regulation: The Arrangement on Officially 
Supported Export Credit', 45 Harvard International Law Journal 65 (2004), at 101. 
70 Article 3 of the Arrangement.  
71 Nicola Bonucci, OECD Work on Export Credits: A Legal and Institutional Laboratory', in Smart Rules for Fair 
Trade: 50 Years of Export Credits (OECD 2011) 49-55, at 52.  
72 OECD, ‘The Participants to the Export Credit Arrangement’, http://www.oecd.org/tad/xcred/participants.htm 
(visited 9 September 2015). 
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The Arrangement has been effective because of its precision, involving clear, 
comprehensive, detailed commitments, and because of its flexibility, adaptability, and ease of 
revision to address new circumstances, and to address particular sectors through sector 
understandings.73 In the past decade alone, the Participants negotiated new or updated sector rules 
on civil aircraft (2011), nuclear power plants (2009), climate change (2014), and rail projects 
(2014). The Arrangement clearly defines the types of government support measures covered,74 and 
the most favorable terms ECAs can offer prospective borrowers.75 These specific, technical 
definitions remove ambiguity, and thus facilitate implementation and monitoring through the 
Arrangement’s procedures for information exchange and notification.76 Repayment terms such as 
the minimum interest rate are set by specific, technical formulae that automatically adjust based 
on commercial interest rates and other economic indicators.77 These automatic adjustment 
mechanisms allow the Arrangement to maintain its flexibility and relevance despite changing 
market conditions.  
 The Arrangement also provides for transparent derogations from its guidelines, subject to 
compliance with clear procedures based on reciprocal notifications and information exchange.78 
These procedures accommodate changing contexts while maintaining trust. Participants must 
notify other Participants when they intend to offer financing terms that utilize a permitted 
exception or derogates from the Arrangement guidelines.79  Other Participants then can engage in 
face-to-face consultations about the derogations, and they have the ability to match the non-
conforming terms and conditions.80 This notification and match procedure is described as the 
“heart” of the Arrangement because it tolerates non-adherence to its substantive rules if 
Participants follow the agreed procedures.81 This process recognizes that derogation is inevitable, 
and so it emphasizes information exchange and transparency while providing procedures that 
permit matching the derogation to eliminate any competitive advantage. Taken together, these 
procedures provide a mechanism where Participants can exchange information and resolve 
disagreements before a transaction is finalized, building trust and giving Participants the 
confidence that the rules are being followed.82  
 Participants also can use an enquiry procedure to ask other Participants about the most 
favorable credit terms and conditions they would be willing to support in a given transaction, as 
                                                 
73 There are sector understandings for ships; nuclear power plants; civil aircraft; renewable energy, climate change 
mitigation and adaptation, and water projects; and rail infrastructure. These understandings are incorporated into 
Annexes I-V of the Arrangement. OECD, ‘Export Credits Sector Understandings’ (7 July 2014), 
http://www.oecd.org/tad/xcred/sector-understanding.htm (visited 1 September 2015). 
74 Article 5 of the Arrangement (defining the forms of official support covered by the Arrangement). 
75 Chapter 2 of the Arrangement.  
76 See Levit, above n 69, at 105 (noting the Arrangement’s specificity may enhance compliance by eliminating 
ambiguities that disguise non-compliance).  
77 Articles 11-12 of the Arrangement (setting maximum repayment terms according to the World Bank’s calculation 
of per capita GNI); Articles 19-22 of the Arrangement (establishing minimum interest rates based on government 
bond yields). 
78 Chapter IV of the Arrangement. 
79 Articles 43, 47-50 of the Arrangement.  
80 Articles 18, 42, 45-46, 52-53, 57 of the Arrangement. 
81 Levit, above n 69, at 109-10. 
82 David Drysdale, 'Why the OECD Arrangement Works (Even Though It Is Only Soft Law)', in Andreas Klasen and 
Fiona Bannert (eds), The Future of Foreign Trade Support—Setting Global Standards for Export Credit and Political 
Risk Insurance (Wiley-Blackwell, 2015). 
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well as information regarding third-party countries, institutions, and methods of doing business.83 
ECAs can then use the responses to gather information on how best to structure and evaluate their 
own financing packages. This process gives Participants access to “real time transparency” by 
providing a procedure and a forum for the timely exchange of confidential transaction data.84  
 The status of the Arrangement within the OECD and as a commitment is one of “useful 
ambiguity.”85 As a “Gentleman’s Agreement among the participants” the Arrangement is not an 
Act of the OECD, although the OECD Secretariat provides administrative support. The “soft” 
nature of the Arrangement works to its advantage by lowering the bar to commitment for the 
Participants. Because the instruments are not formally binding, they can more easily be reviewed, 
modified, amended, and strengthened.86  
 The Arrangement and ECG engage a small, close-knit, technical group of government 
officials engaged in export credit practices, the ECAs themselves. Their constant interaction 
facilitates adaptations and revisions of the Arrangement over time, as well as its incorporation into 
domestic laws and regulations. Officials from ECAs participate in delegations alongside national 
trade and treasury representatives. As a result, the instruments are developed and implemented by 
practitioners, giving them legal coherence and making them operationally sound. This technocratic 
network of ECA officials has developed a sense of camaraderie and collegiality over time.87 
Repeated interaction through the notification and consultation procedures builds trust, since these 
procedures magnify the reputational and professional costs of non-compliance.88  
 The Arrangement, although formally non-binding, has been implemented in whole or part, 
directly or by reference, into the laws and regulations of the EU, US, and other Participants.89 
Countries also have adopted rules to implement the sector understandings, including Brazil for 
aircraft subsidies. Most importantly, the Arrangement and sector agreements have affected the 
understandings of appropriate credit practices in the ECAs themselves. These instruments thus can 
be viewed as helping to create a transnational legal order since the law is not limited to the 
international plane but includes domestic law and agency regulation and practices.90 Levit’s 
detailed study of ECA financing programs found that Participant compliance with the 
Arrangement was “high, sustained, and steady throughout the Arrangement’s life.”91 To date, only 
                                                 
83 Articles 55-56 of the Arrangement. 
84 See Drysdale, above n 82.  
85 John Ray, ‘The Arrangement from the Inside’, in The Export Credit Arrangement: Achievements and Challenges 
1978-1999 (1998), 33-37 at 33; Levit, above n 69, at 116 (finding the agreement’s legal ambiguity played a significant 
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86 See Bonucci, above n 71, at 50-51.  
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developed from informal social meetings between the Participants). 
88 Levit, above n 69, at 127.  
89 The Arrangement’s guidelines are incorporated into EU regulations. See Regulation (EU) No 1233/2011 of the 
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credits and repealing Council Decisions 2001/76/EC and 2001/77/EC, 2011 OJ (L. 326) 45. The United States, 
Australia, Switzerland, New Zealand, and one of Norway’s ECAs (Export Credit Norway), each make explicit 
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reference to the Arrangement. Confirmed to authors in emails in 2015 from ECA officials.  
90 Halliday and Shaffer, above n 8. 
91 Levit, above n 69, at 94. 
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one export credit dispute among the Participants has reached the WTO, and it involved 
shipbuilding where the understanding is less precise.92 
 Although the Arrangement is limited to only a subset of countries, in 1995, it was 
incorporated by reference as a carve out to the illustrative list of prohibited export subsidies in 
Annex 1 of the ASCM (as item k). Any WTO member who acts within the framework of the 
Arrangement, even without being a formal Participant to it, is deemed to comply with WTO 
obligations. In this way, the Arrangement has become a worldwide standard.93 WTO panels have 
addressed the Arrangement in aircraft subsidy disputes, such as between Canada and Brazil, which 
in turn has led to revisions of the sector understanding, as well as Brazil’s joining the sector 
understanding on civil aircraft.  
 This multilateralization of the Arrangement without the participation of all affected 
countries, however, creates both legitimacy and practical challenges. Brazil, China, Colombia, 
India, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Mexico, Russia, Sri Lanka, Turkey, Indonesia, Argentina, Ecuador, 
Zimbabwe, Singapore, Oman, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Hong Kong, Uzbekistan, and South 
Africa are not formal participants in the Arrangement, but have officially supported ECAs.94 These 
non-Participant ECAs have not undertaken commitments under the Arrangement, and they can 
provide repayment terms and interest rates that are more competitive than Participants, but they 
tend not to because they would be at risk of a complaint in the WTO. The growth of non-
Arrangement based financing is reducing the Arrangement’s effectiveness.95 Participants thus are 
working to develop new ways to entice non-Participants to abide by the Arrangement’s constraints. 
Were membership in the Arrangement to expand significantly, however, the adaptation and 
development of the Arrangement by consensus could become more difficult.  
 The Arrangement demonstrates that formally non-binding rules developed outside the 
WTO can effectively discipline subsidies when a relatively small group of trading partners is 
affected and the scope of the agreement is circumscribed. The Arrangement uses precise and 
comprehensive language that helps ensure that common understanding informs practice. 
Automatic adjustment mechanisms enable adaptation to changing economic conditions. 
Information exchange and notification procedures build professional trust. By allowing some 
leeway on substantive compliance while insisting on transparent procedures and notification 
mechanisms, these instruments provide state actors with more autonomy, while preserving 
transparency and reducing informational asymmetry. This transparency encourages actors to 
conform to the discipline. The development and continual evolution of the Arrangement shows 
that, at least in small groups, consensus decision-making is possible to facilitate updating and 
compliance with normative commitments. Where the barriers to entry are low for observers and 
new members, such mechanisms can ensure inclusiveness so that understandings do not unravel.  
 
                                                 
92 Drysdale, above n 82.  
93 Bonucci, above n 71, at 51. 
94 Based on data from Benjamin Esty, 'Export Credit Agencies', Harvard Business School,  
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B. OECD Shipbuilding Initiatives 
 
The OECD is also the primary forum for discussion of the trade issues related to steel and 
shipbuilding.96 The OECD Steel Committee and the Working Party on Shipbuilding allow major 
producers in these sectors to exchange information and examine conditions and trends in the 
market. The demand for ships and steel is cyclical, with increased pressure for government 
intervention in these politically powerful sectors during periods of low demand. The OECD’s 
technical expertise and experience, combined with a membership that includes many of the major 
players in these sectors, made it a natural forum for the development of new subsidy disciplines 
for steel and shipbuilding. We focus on the shipbuilding initiatives.    
 Worldwide shipbuilding capacity has long exceeded demand due to the prevalence of 
shipbuilding subsidies. Post-war Japan (and later South Korea and China) provided support to 
domestic shipyards as a tool to promote economic growth and development. As European 
shipbuilders lost market share to Japanese shipyards in the 1950s, they sought subsidies rather than 
close mismanaged and outdated shipyards. Increased state aid in the form of easy credit terms, 
new construction subsidies, and buyer incentives caused significant overcapacity in the sector, 
severely depressing the price of ships. In response, OECD members created the Council Working 
Party on Shipbuilding (WP6) in 1966 to identify and progressively eliminate subsidies and other 
measures that distort the shipbuilding market. Spurred by a drop in demand, WP6 members 
developed policies to stabilize the shipbuilding industry with the 1972 “General Arrangement for 
the Progressive Removal of Obstacles to Normal Competitive Conditions in the Shipbuilding 
Industry,” which encouraged members to reduce domestic subsidies and notify support measures. 
The 1976 General Guidelines for Government Policies in the Shipbuilding Industry pushed for 
shipbuilding capacity reductions and increased transparency.97 Although these guidelines were 
non-binding, domestic shipbuilding policies in Japan and Europe conformed to these informal 
commitments.98 Referencing the General Guidelines, Japan cut shipbuilding capacity by 35% 
between 1976-1986.99 In nearly the same period, the European Community reduced its capacity 
by an estimated 48%.100 Between 1973 and the mid-1980s, shipbuilding capacity was reduced by 
50 percent in the OECD area.101 However, overcapacity and subsidization remained a problem, 
partially due to new producers entering the market, prompting calls for a binding agreement on 
shipbuilding subsidies.102 
 In 1989, the US initiated negotiations for an agreement on shipbuilding subsidies at the 
urging of the Shipbuilders Council of America. The agreement was completed and signed in 1994 
by countries representing eighty percent of the world’s shipbuilding capacity,  but it failed in the 
US Senate due to opposition from large domestic shipbuilding interests who objected to certain 
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terms, which, they believed, favored other parties.103 It thus did not enter into effect. A second 
series of talks at the OECD from 2002 to 2005 was aimed at resurrecting the shipbuilding 
agreement and bringing about normal competitive conditions in the industry.104 The negotiations 
resulted in a draft text that would have mirrored the ASCM, and included a dispute resolution 
mechanism, a list of prohibited and non-actionable subsidies, and separate disciplines for 
developing countries. The talks were suspended in 2005, however, and ultimately terminated in 
2010, due to inability to reach a consensus on pricing rules.105   
 The WP6 nonetheless continues to provide an informal mechanism to discipline 
shipbuilding subsidies. It updates the shipbuilding support database, providing a yearly inventory 
of OECD and non-OECD support measures, and it conducts peer reviews of national shipbuilding 
industries.106 It conducts workshops for the exchange of ideas and best practices in the shipbuilding 
industry. And WP6 members also developed the sector understanding on export credits in 
shipbuilding noted above.  
This working party provides the primary international forum for non-state actors, like the 
International Chamber of Shipping, to engage with government representatives on shipbuilding 
subsidies, although it largely passes under the radar of NGOs. These processes of information 
exchange and peer review shape normative understandings of shipbuilding subsidies that create a 
form of discipline that is underappreciated because it does not involve formally binding law. But 
this informal law that emerges through social interaction in WP6 does have behavioral effects, 
reflected, for example, in shipbuilding policies in the EU and Japan in the 1970s. 
 
C.  Fisheries Subsidies 
 
Fishing provides both jobs and food security, which makes fisheries subsidies politically and 
economically popular in many countries. Yet subsidies that promote capacity building accelerate 
the process of fishery depletion, a major global problem. A study of global fisheries estimated that 
57.4 percent of fish stocks were fully exploited, and 29.9 percent of those stocks were 
overexploited.107 Many commercially important species are becoming endangered and are 
vulnerable to collapse. The challenge of responsibly managing fisheries, especially those on the 
high seas, is exacerbated because fisheries are open-access resources. 
 Estimates indicate that the fisheries sector receives more than US$35 billion in subsidies 
each year, with US$20 billion for capacity building.108 These numbers are only estimates, 
however, because notifications of subsidies to the WTO are limited in part because of conceptual 
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ambiguity about the classification of such subsidies under WTO rules,109 and they are 
underreported in other organizations. Between 2000 and 2003, the US reported more than US$1 
billion in Government Financial Transfers (GFT) to fisheries to the OECD, but notified only 
US$79 million to the WTO under its narrower definition of a subsidy.110 The WTO concluded that 
“a common feature of all official data available on fisheries subsidies (looking at OECD, APEC 
and WTO data) is that they provide a very limited coverage of fisheries subsidies granted by 
countries other than the EU(15), United States, Canada, Norway, Iceland, Australia and New 
Zealand.”111 The weakness of ASCM notification and surveillance reduces the usefulness of data 
available in the WTO, undermining attempts to discipline the sector through the WTO.112 
 For a generation, states have been looking for better disciplines on fisheries subsidies on 
two tracks, one through United Nations (UN) organizations and the other through the WTO, with 
both being spurred by NGOs. On one track, the UN, through the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the Fish Stocks Agreement, created a legal regime for 
sustainable fishery management that included compliance mechanisms but made no explicit 
reference to subsidies.113 In parallel, the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) negotiated 
a series of non-binding fisheries rules, and one of its International Plans of Action explicitly called 
for assessment and elimination of subsidies and other factors that contribute to excessive fishing 
capacity.114 In addition, the FAO worked to clarify and define fisheries subsidies through its 
technical guide on identifying, assessing and reporting on fisheries subsidies.115 The United 
Nations Environment Program (UNEP) focused on the trade aspects of fisheries subsidies in 
concert with NGOs, such as the WWF to engage experts, international institutions and key officials 
and to raise awareness of the anti-competitive impact of fisheries subsidies on developing 
countries.116  
 The effect of these efforts is mixed. Compliance with the norms developed by these 
organizations was limited by the weak, voluntary nature of these agreements, as well as the lack 
of effective peer review or enforcement mechanisms to secure compliance.117 But  these soft-law 
contributions improved the definitions, data, and international commitment towards fisheries 
subsidy reform, and paved the way for discussions regarding a fisheries subsidies discipline within 
the WTO.118 For example, supporters and opponents of fisheries disciplines alike could draw upon 
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FAO definitions and data to support policy positions.119 Similarly, developing countries could 
point to UNEP country studies to make their case for subsidy reductions in developed countries. 
In this way, the FAO and UN surmounted their institutional limitations by playing a supportive 
and facilitative role toward the development of subsidy disciplines regarding fisheries within the 
ASCM.120 
 The second track is within the WTO.121 The ASCM applies to fisheries subsidies, but only 
to the extent that it covers any subsidy, so that it contains no specific rules relating to fish.  In the 
1986 Punta del Este declaration launching the Uruguay Round, fish was only indirectly mentioned 
in connection with the negotiations on natural resource-based products, where the aim was simply 
to enhance market access.122 At the WTO Seattle ministerial meeting in 1999, the fisheries trade 
issue was specifically characterized for the first time as involving subsidies that contribute to 
overcapacity and overfishing.123 Many members, however, expressed concerns relating to 
intrusions on domestic policy space, the need for development exceptions, and the possibility of 
defining a category of acceptable fisheries subsidies.124 The 2001 Doha Development Agenda, the 
mandate for the Doha Round negotiations, expressly linked subsidies and environmental concerns, 
but the topic was assigned to the Rules negotiations together with other ASCM issues.125 
 The Doha Round negotiations on fisheries subsidies have moved even more slowly than 
other aspects of the round. In his report after the 2008 breakdown the Chair concluded that unlike 
other Rules issues where he provided a draft text, all he could do on fish was provide a road map.126 
Convergence on the issues was difficult because negotiators advanced differing conceptual 
premises that may simply mask their view of national interests in light of the structure of their 
fisheries industry and the nature of any state support provided. Despite all sorts of opportunities 
for informal information sharing and learning in workshops outside the WTO organized by 
international organizations such as UNEP, and by NGOs such as WWF and ICSTD, and despite 
the evident fingerprints of NGOs in a draft fisheries text,127 the expert consensus on what needs to 
be done had not been translated into consensual understanding among negotiators. The 
Chairperson observed that “all participants recognize the global crisis of overcapacity and 
overfishing,” attributing the negotiation impasse to divergence in understanding of the issue and 
the rules that should apply, with wide conceptual gaps on such basic factors as which subsidies 
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should and should not be prohibited, the special needs of developing countries, and the criteria for 
general exceptions.128 
 Why have the negotiations stalled? Negotiators could not build on existing concepts, since 
the usual motivation for disciplines in the ASCM is the effects of a measure on trade. Nothing in 
the ASCM deals with overcapacity or resource management. Farm subsidies, the source of endless 
disputes in the GATT, are covered by the Agreement on Agriculture. Such subsidies may be easier 
to discipline because they demonstrably hurt farmers in other countries. Although fisheries 
subsidies also have negative economic externalities for the fishing sector in other countries, they 
have not formed the major basis of any formal WTO complaint, and only two complaints have had 
even a tangential connection to the fish trade.129  
 The draft text on fisheries subsidies provides an example of how informal law can emerge 
and influence subsidy disciplines. Reaching consensus on the notion that fisheries subsidies 
represented a suitable subject for WTO negotiations took years of effort by international 
organizations, governments, and NGOs.130 First was the patient work of the FAO, UNEP, regional 
fishery commissions, and the OECD in gathering information on the state of fish stocks and 
monitoring the effects of fishery operations. Second was a series of multilateral agreements that 
began to build a governance regime for fisheries management. Third was the building of an 
unconventional alliance of countries concerned with the impact of fisheries subsidies on efforts to 
manage fish stocks sustainably. Fourth was the analytic and campaigning power of civil society 
groups like the WWF and the ICTSD. These groups demonstrated the need for reform, reframed 
the issue in WTO language, and created pressure for action.  But rules negotiators struggled to 
reach a consensual understanding on the causal connections between fisheries subsidies, the 
trading system, and the environmental impact of overfishing, so the disciplines remain weak. 
 
D. Fossil Fuel Subsidies 
 
Disciplines on fossil fuel subsidies are essential to combat climate change, but difficult for political 
reasons because of their popularity in developed and developing countries where consumption 
subsidies often are viewed as progressive in providing assistance to the poor and middle classes, 
and production subsidies are claimed to be necessary to promote economic growth. Fossil fuel 
subsidies are viewed primarily as a public goods issue, rather than as a trade problem adversely 
affecting other countries’ producer interests. Just as for fisheries subsidies, current efforts by 
NGOs and other international organizations on fossil fuel subsidies can set the stage for 
discussions to create disciplines in the future. This case study looks at how international 
organizations are addressing the issue of fossil fuel subsidies, particularly in their approach to 
definitions, transparency, and obligations. We look at the WTO, OECD, International Energy 
Agency (IEA), IMF, G-20, and the UN.  
 The ability to generate consensus and compromise on international fossil fuel subsidies 
begins with the quality of the data available through notification and reporting processes, which, 
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in turn, depends on the definition of a “subsidy.”131 The WTO general subsidy definition covers a 
defined list of financial contributions or price or income support provided by a government, and 
requires that a benefit be conferred to the recipient and WTO rules further narrow the definition of 
those subsidies that Members must notify to “specific” subsidies.132 Ambiguity as to whether a 
measure confers a benefit or is sufficiently specific provides Members with a justification not to 
notify it. In contrast, other organizations such as the OECD and IMF use economic rather than 
trade-related definitions that can be tailored to the subsidy at issue,133 with the result that they are 
able to gather more data, which both enhances transparency and is useful for analytic purposes.  
 OECD definitions differ in practice for industrial subsidies, fossil fuel subsidies, 
environmentally harmful subsidies, and agriculture “support.” The OECD inventory measures 
fossil fuel support (referencing the Producer and Consumer Subsidy Equivalents [PSE-CSE] 
framework used in Agriculture) in terms of measures that support or favor fossil fuel use or 
production.134 Although the inventory uses a deliberately broad definition, it does not measure 
support provided through risk transfers, concessional loans, or market price support.135 The OECD 
inventory is useful because it provides policy information beyond the amount of the subsidy, such 
as information about the type of subsidy and the conditions necessary to receive the subsidy. The 
IEA provides complementary data to supplement the OECD inventory because it measures the 
difference between the price to consumers and an international reference price (price-gap method), 
capturing the market price support that the OECD definition does not address. The IEA definition, 
however, would not capture the support measures that do not directly affect the consumer price of 
fossil fuels.136  
 The IMF defines energy subsidies broadly to include both production and consumption 
subsidies. It measures consumption subsidies using a price-gap approach and includes a corrective 
tax intended to reflect the negative externalities of fossil fuel production in their “reference” 
price.137 According to this broader definition, IMF estimates of global energy subsidies, not all of 
which affect fossil fuels, are much higher.138 
 The weakest definition of fossil fuel subsidies is in the ambiguous G-20 commitment to 
reduce “inefficient” fossil fuel subsidies that encourage “wasteful” consumption.139 Given such an 
ambiguous definition, countries have greater incentives to avoid notifying fossil fuel subsidies,. 
The relationship between the definition used and subsequent transparency is readily apparent when 
comparing notifications of fossil fuel support measures between these organizations. Between 
2008 and 2013, there were 640 notifications for fossil fuels reported in the OECD inventory, 
compared to 64 WTO SCM notifications, and only 35 notified in the G-20.140  
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 Turning to existing organizational efforts to discipline fossil fuel subsidies, we find wide 
variation in organizational activity. Within the WTO, little attention has been given to the issue. 
WTO Members asked only 14 questions about fossil fuel subsidies in the SCM Committee 
between 2008 and 2013.141 The G-20 process, in contrast, has focused on understanding and 
comparing each country’s fossil fuel policies and sharing reform experiences. The 2009 G-20 
commitment required countries to create and share their implementation plans for the reduction of 
fossil fuel subsidies.142 The data is poor, however, because of the ambiguous definition and 
inconsistent voluntary reporting, which reduces transparency and trust that partners are 
reciprocally notifying their subsidies and meeting their commitments In other words, good data is 
critical to drive discussions of fossil fuel subsidies and the creation of new disciplines.  
 At the 2012 Los Cabos Summit, G-20 members reported on the implementation of their 
commitments.143 Some countries had made notable progress with their implementation plans, but 
the G-20 reiterated the need to improve how fossil fuel subsidies are defined, and to standardize 
reporting.144 In 2013, G-20 finance ministers agreed to undertake a “voluntary peer review process 
for fossil fuel subsidies” and later developed a methodology for that process.145 A 2014 roundtable 
by the Friends of Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform146 noted that the US and China had voluntarily 
agreed to undergo peer review under the G-20, while Peru and New Zealand did the same under a 
similar Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) framework.147 Suggestions for improving 
transparency in the sector include standardizing the submission process for subsidy information, 
requiring justifications for excluding certain subsidies from the G-20 commitment, separating 
subsidy reporting from the reform of rules to build transparency, establishing an oversight board, 
and setting more definite timelines to ensure G-20 members can meet their commitments.  
 The UN system has contributed nothing to definitions or data, so far. In the outcome 
document for the September 2015 UN Summit, “Transforming our World: The 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development,” goal 12.c calls on members to “rationalize inefficient fossil-fuel 
subsidies that encourage wasteful consumption by removing market distortions, in accordance 
with national circumstances, including by restructuring taxation and phasing out those harmful 
subsidies.”148  Intensive work is now under way on designing review and follow-up on these new 
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sustainable development goals, but fossil fuel subsidies are unlikely to receive much attention.149 
Fossil fuel subsidy reform ought to be included as part of any strategy to reduce greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions, but the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has not 
prioritized subsidy reform in its agenda.150 It could be that many countries will include fossil fuel 
subsidies reform in their Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC) submitted for the 
2015 Paris Conference of the Parties. We have not conducted an analysis of Section J on 
transparency of action and support in the UNFCCC draft negotiating text for Paris, but the 
UNFCCC will have an intensive review process that may well cover fossil fuel subsidies in 
INDCs.151 
 The IMF’s studies and analyses can increase pressure for reform by revealing the harmful 
impact of subsidization. Unlike the other organizations involved to date, the IMF has a coercive 
tool to reduce fossil fuel subsidies through the financial leverage it can apply, at least against 
developing countries and countries in transition. The IMF’s assistance agreement with Ukraine 
provides an example. In April 2014, the IMF and Ukraine agreed on a US$17 billion loan, with 
disbursements dependent on performance.152 Part of the deal called for broad reductions in energy 
subsidies, which were as high as eight percent of gross domestic product (GDP).153 Overall, the 
IMF mechanism of conditioning aid on the implementation of subsidy reform, along with technical 
support, has had mixed success, however.154 The asymmetry of IMF treatment of large developed 
and small developing countries affects the legitimacy of IMF actions, which can lead to developing 
country resistance. 
 In sum, subsidy disciplines on fossil fuels are at best nascent. Nonetheless, they are now 
on the global agenda as actors work toward developing social consensus, primarily through 
formally non-binding initiatives. These initiatives will be much more effective if meaningful 
reporting, transparency, and peer-review mechanisms can be developed within one or more 
organizations.  
 
IV. Conclusion: What Works? 
 
 Disciplining government support through formally binding rules is notoriously difficult. 
We thus asked: Can informal rules offer a complement and alternative? And if so, what works? 
The simple answer is, nothing works really well, but that answer applies to formal as well as 
informal rules. At the WTO with its formally binding rules, the dispute settlement system is not 
always useful, negotiations on new rules are blocked, and the less formal surveillance mechanisms 
are hampered by patchy data and the reluctance of some Members to challenge each other with 
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questions. Sectoral (or vertical) discipline of agriculture subsidies, however, does seem stronger 
than the horizontal disciplines, a point that helped motivate our turn to other case studies. Thus, 
the more complex answer to the question, what works, is a comparative institutional one.155  
Our expectation at the outset was that definitional clarity (dimension 1) allows for stronger 
discipline (dimension 2) because everyone understands the obligations. More data means more 
sunshine (dimension 3), which allows trading partners and stakeholders to apply pressure for 
reform; and such pressure is more readily applied (dimension 4) in organizations with a strong 
institutional structure. Informal law can lead to social sanctions (such as consumer boycotts), or 
affect financing (such as from the IMF or World Bank), and thus work through coercion. It can 
work through reciprocity such as in WTO and OECD peer-review systems based on reciprocal 
commitments, reporting, monitoring, and evaluation. It can lead to policy learning through 
information sharing and deliberation. And it can lead to social emulation and model mongering 
affecting practice. We expected that the success of any process depends on generating trustworthy 
data, identifying the relevant actors, and providing a forum for bringing them together.  
Certain organizations and mechanisms have comparative advantages over others, whether 
as alternatives or as complements. In the case of subsidies, our four case studies demonstrate that 
institutional choice varies with the issue area, and that institutional effectiveness depends on the 
clarity of definition, consensus over obligation, access and trustworthiness of information, and 
institutional monitoring structure. These factors affect participation, decision making, and 
organizational practice, which, in turn, affect outcomes. 
The OECD-based export credit Arrangement shows how a formally non-binding 
mechanism can give rise to a transnational legal order that permeates national law and practices. 
It created detailed rules that were formally non-binding, but were defined and clarified by 
consensus decision making over time, combined with notification and peer review mechanisms to 
ensure compliance. These mechanisms gave rise to normative settlement across the governmental 
and quasi-governmental bodies that administer export credits in OECD countries. Despite the 
Arrangement’s considerable success, however, it now faces new challenge of whether its virtues 
(limited membership and flexible procedures) can survive the necessary expansion to include large 
emerging countries that traditionally have not been part of the OECD club but increasingly use 
export credits to subsidize exports.  
The OECD’s initiatives on shipbuilding subsidies, in contrast, focused on developing 
formally binding law backed by dispute settlement. From the conventional perspective of lawyers, 
such hard law should give rise to broader compliance with agreed norms. The focus on hard law 
backed by dispute settlement, however, made reaching agreement much more difficult. With its 
smaller membership (compared to the WTO’s almost global coverage), and its ability to include 
important, non-OECD shipbuilding countries, insiders viewed the WP6 as representing a “feasible, 
faster and leaner alternative to WTO negotiations.”156 Because the issues were focused on a 
particular sector and because membership was small in light of the few countries producing large 
ships, many expected that disciplines — whether formal (through a binding agreement) or informal 
(through formally non-binding undertakings) — should be easier to develop. This narrow focus on 
only one sector, as opposed to the WTO’s broad scope, nonetheless, had a disadvantage, at least 
for negotiating formally binding rules backed by formal dispute settlement, since it reduced the 
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possibility for “package deals” that involve more than one industry. As a result, a group of 
powerful domestic constituencies, in the U.S. in particular, was able to derail the negotiations. 
The linkage of the trade effects of fisheries subsidies to the broader concern of sustainable 
fishing practices activated a broad array of actors that included NGOs. This decades-long, 
inclusive process made the development of disciplines more likely by generating the data and 
technical skills, and building toward the consensus necessary, to place fisheries subsidies on the 
global trade agenda. The data produced by the monitoring efforts of groups like the OECD made 
it possible to analyze the effects of different types of subsidies. Yet, because fisheries subsidies 
have been defined predominantly as a public goods issue, rather than a trade issue, agreement 
within the WTO and elsewhere has been more difficult to achieve, whether involving formally 
binding rules or non-binding mechanisms.  
One approach to the impasse on fisheries subsidies could be to reference the principles and 
definitions developed by other institutions to define the extent of Member obligations in a WTO 
agreement,157 similar to the incorporation by reference of the Arrangement on Export Credits into 
an Annex of the ASCM.158 The 2007 draft Chairman’s text went in this direction by including a 
provision allowing an exception to subsidies disciplines if fisheries-related information was 
notified to the relevant body of the FAO, where it would be subject to peer review prior to the 
granting of the subsidy.159 The FAO transparency exercise would pertain only to things like the 
quality of the country’s fisheries management system. Review of the subsidy as such would still 
take place in the SCM Committee. Most delegations resisted this idea, arguing that the WTO 
should be able to conduct surveillance of its own rules, but some delegations saw it as an effective 
way to deal with a technically complex issue.160 The recent EU proposal on subsidies notification 
might prove more acceptable.161 
The inability to reach a consensus on the framing of the issue of fossil fuel subsidies 
similarly limited the ability to agree on and apply new disciplines. In particular, parties could not 
resolve the inherent tensions between viewing such subsidies as a problem of general domestic 
economic policy (hence whether they are “inefficient”), a global public goods problem (as a 
contributor to climate change), or as a trade issue (involving externalities for trading partners). The 
confusion about purposes became reflected in confusion over definitions. Vague definitions, in 
turn, hampered notifications because it was not clear what countries must notify. As a result, data 
on fossil fuel subsidies remains poor, and there has been inadequate surveillance in all bodies with 
a mandate to oversee them. The governance of fossil fuels subsidies thus remains a global 
challenge. Nonetheless, for the first time, fossil fuel subsidies are on the global agenda, and 
networks of NGOs work with governments and international organizations to improve data. It is 
only through such ongoing interaction and data sharing that social consensus eventually may 
develop regarding such subsidies, so that new disciplines emerge. 
One thread running through the four case studies is that subsidies defined as public goods 
problems involve different organizations and dynamics compared to subsidies defined in purely 
trade terms. Countries have found it more difficult to reach the social consensus necessary for 
comprehensive disciplines on subsidies that pose public goods challenges either within or outside 
of the WTO. It has been difficult even to agree on the definition of the subsidies to be notified in 
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 29 
these areas, which is the first step for obtaining information to enhance social understanding and 
facilitate discipline. 
The other thread running through the case studies is that disciplines on subsidies begin with 
information, and that this public good is under-supplied. The OECD arguably has the largest and 
most up-to-date database on subsidies of all international organizations, although it is 
predominantly sector specific, and does not use consistent definitions of subsidies across its 
databases for industrial subsidies, agricultural subsidies, and environmentally harmful subsidies. 
This shortcoming of the OECD is illustrative of the general problem — data are not neutral. The 
information available depends on the definitions used, and that reflects consensus on the purpose 
for which the information is being gathered and thus what the international organization and its 
members are trying to do. Some bodies exist to facilitate learning and promote consensual 
understanding; others aim to support negotiations on rules, and ensure credible commitments, or 
manage conflict among states; while others aspire to promote domestic policy change. All of these 
objectives must be part of an effort to discipline subsidies. All of the international organizations 
examined in this article have all of these objectives, but their emphasis varies. Given that a simple 
integrated structure of binding rules is not likely soon, we contend that the path to better disciplines 
begins with more transparency. 
How can we generate more and better information? There are limits to subsidies 
notification by governments, not least because trade ministries may not have the information easily 
at hand, or be sure of what to report, and where. Reverse notification by trading partners helps, but 
no country has an incentive to provide this under-supplied public good. WTO Members are also 
sensitive about notifying things on which they are negotiating. During the intense period of Doha 
Round agriculture negotiations, even the largest Members were late with notification. One option 
is for the WTO Secretariat to become more active in collecting information and making it 
available. The inadequate notifications by WTO Members can be partially mitigated by giving the 
Secretariat increased scope and resources to act as the “common agent” of Members in assembling 
information that was or ought to have been notified, adding data from all other international 
organizations and NGOs to create a better picture of the incidence of subsidies in a sector or a 
market, with an opportunity for the Member concerned to verify the information.162 
Our story in the end, as Justice Brandeis argued a century ago, is that sunshine helps. 
Informal rules may or may not be more “efficient” than codified law, but they can provide 
discipline, and thus can be viewed as law. In the case of subsidies, with better information, and 
robust surveillance, governments providing them will need to explain themselves to their peers 
and to citizens. Such interactive processes of information exchange, knowledge production, and 
reason giving can generate new consensual understanding about subsidies disciplines, which is 
where all law, whether formal or informal, begins. 
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